Majakowski kommentoinut pidemmin rintamatilannetta tänään, otetaan kokonanaisuudessaan.
Oma kommentti: Ukraina ei ole tosiaan tehnyt näyttäviä Krimin iskuja enää muutamaan viikkoon. Muutenkin kaukovaikuttaminen tuntuu vähentyneen. Onko myrskyvarjot lopussa vai kenties niin vähissä, että pitää odottaa erityisen otollisia hetkiä? Onko kaikki mehukas poistettu HIMARS:n kantamilta? Jälkimmäisiä tuntuu kyllä riittävän. Mikä yhteys kaukovaikuttamisen vähentymisessä on etelän suunnan jämähtämiseen?
Ikävä tosiasia on, että ryssä kykeni samanaikaisesti torppaamaan Ukrainan eteläisen hyökkäyksen mateluvauhdiksi, ottamaan jatkuvia kovia miehistötappioita Bakhmutin seudulla ja kuitenkin varustamaan Avdiivkan puskua varten ja muita pienempiä puskuja varten suhteellisen isoja joukkoja. Niitä reservejä kuitenkin näytti olevan.
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Comment:Russians are putting many of the reserves accumulated in recent months into numerous attacks, even at the cost of huge losses like in Avdivka. Which in itself demonstrates the presence of reserves that can be spent not only in the defensive phase, but also in the offensive phase. The objective is therefore not only to crush the Ukrainian counter-offensive, but to archive some successes before the season of rain and mud. However, it must be said that they are local and not organic attacks. Russia remains incapable of large-scale offensive maneuvers. The substantial failure of the Advikva offensive demonstrates this once again. On the other hand, the Ukrainian counter-offensive has now finished its thrust. The only remaining battlefields are in the Robotyne area, where the proximity to the villages of Novoprokopivka and Verbove will allow the fighting to continue even in bad weather. But here the Russians have inserted important reserves, and the battle will be made up of attacks and counterattacks (as in recent days), which will continue. On the rest of the front I expect a progressive slowdown in operations as autumn and winter arrive
I add as a gloss this morning: In the last 2 weeks, Ukrainian attacks on Russian logistics in the deep lines have drastically decreased. It is probable that there will be a decrease in Atamcs\storm shadow ammunition and that new arrivals are awaited. But this shows, as I said some time ago, that if you don't give continuity to the action of hitting Crimea, Melitopol, Tokmok, Berdyansk and all the Russian deep lines, you won't be able to trap the Russian machine, which has enormous quantitative resources. It is no coincidence that Russian offensives and the slowdown (if not regression) of the action in Zaporizha occurred in the period in which deep strikes were limited in number.
