Venäjän toimenpiteet Katynin muistojuhlassa jatkoa itse tapahtumalle, kertoo Jessikka Aro uudessa kirjassaan.
Koko valtion ylin johto lähti kertaheitolla taivaallisiin pataljooniin. Salaliittopiireissä kohistiin aikanaan videosta, joka oli väitetysti otettu turmapaikalta maahansyöksyn jälkeen ja siinä kuului jostain kumman syystä laukauksia... mutta sehän olisi sitten salaliitto ja niitä ei ole olemassa. Sitä paitsi onnettomuustutkintaa ylivalvoi pääministeri Vladimir Putin ja alempana kihona Sergei Shoigu, joten what's not to believe?
Voisikohan tässä kuitenkin olla jotain yhteyttä Puolan intoon varustautua tällä hetkellä, historian lisäksi tietysti?
https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000010407130.html
Uutuuskirja väittää: Venäjä on vastuussa Puolan vuoden 2010 tuhoisasta lentoturmasta
Jessikka Aron uusi tietokirja kertoo Venäjän informaatiosodasta eri puolilla Eurooppaa ja Afrikkaa.
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MITÄ jos yli 90 eurooppalaisen maan johtavaa viranomaista ja asiantuntijaa hautaan vienyt lentokoneturma ei olisikaan ollut onnettomuus, vaan suunniteltu murha?
Mitä jos myöhemmin paljastuisi, että suljetuissa arkuissa palautetut ruumiinosat oli haudattu muovipusseissa likaisina, sekaisin ja häpäistyinä?
Jessikka Aron tiistaina julkaistun tietokirjan Putinin maailmansota (Johnny Kniga 2024) mukaan juuri näin on käynyt. Lisäksi Venäjä on jo yli vuosikymmenen saanut määrätä sen, kuinka turmasta puhutaan.
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Tässä ote puolalaisen parlamentaarisen komitean (Puolan puolustusministeriön?) v. 2022 julkaistusta (syksyllä 2021 valmistuneesta) onnettomuustutkintaraportista, mihin ilmeisesti viitattiin tuossa HS:n v. 2022 uutisessa:
https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000008748704.html .
Raportin valmistelua johti Laki- ja oikeus-puolueen entinen puolustusministeri
Antoni Macierewicz (
https://www.smolenskcrashnews.com/Antoni-Macierewicz-Biography.html ) ja siinä esitetään vakaavaa kritiikkiä tietenkin koneen räjäyttäneitä venäläisiä, mutta myös tässä auttaneita Puolan tiedustelun Neuvostoliitto/Venäjä-kytköksisiä ja -orientoituneita operaattoreita kohtaan, jotka mahdollistivat ja tukivat operaatiota. Ilman kritiikkiä ei jää myöskään Laki- ja oikeuspuolueen poliittinen vastustaja ja turman aikainen pääministeri Donald Tusk, jonka suhde Laki ja oikeus -puolueen ja sen piiristä tulleen Puolan presidentin (menehtyi turmassa) kanssa oli lievästi sanoen jännitteinen.
Tämä raportti löytyi googlailemalla asiaa seuraavalta sivustolta:
https://www.smolenskcrashnews.com/
https://www.smolenskcrashnews.com/pdf/2022-smolensk-crash-report.pdf
STATE AVIATION AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION
THE SUBCOMMITTEE FOR REINVESTIGATION OF THE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
Report on aviation incident investigation establishing the causes of the crash of the Tu-154M airplane on 10 April 2010 over airport Smolensk-Siewiernyj in the territory of Federation Russian
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3. CONCLUSIONS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
1. The analysis of the circumstances connected with the catastrophe indicates that the key significance had the Tu-154M to be overhauled in Samara in the Aviakor plant owned at that time by Oleg Deripaska, a Russian oligarch and a friend of the then Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, V. V. Putin. This decision was enforced by the special services of the Russian Federation, which controlled the whole overhaul process from the beginning. A significant role was played by the fact that the Polish intelligence services and the Ministry of National Defence gave a positive opinion about the company, despite official warnings from a part of the government apparatus. This decision was influenced by the military men and the Ministry of Defense officials who had been connected with the communist special services in the past and trained in the USSR. But it would not have been possible without the decision or at least the approval of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who supervises the services and is constitutionally responsible for them. As a result, Russian special services took total control not only over the overhaul of Tu-154M No 101 and 102 but also over the preparations for the President's visit in Katyn, the flight of Tu-154M No 101 to Smolensk on 10 April, as well as the research of the catastrophe and the way it was presented by the media in Poland and by important political and media centers in the world.
2. The consequence of this decision was, among other things, realization of repair of Tu154M, which after its return to service underwent numerous failures. Repair works often consisted in replacing faulty parts of Tu-154M No. 102 by faulty parts of Tu-154M No. 101 and vice versa. An example of such actions was the replacement of the left wing slots in Tu-154M No. 102, in which traces of explosives were found after the crash.
3. The supervision of the Russian services over the overhaul gave them the opportunity to take uncontrolled actions that could pose a threat to the safety of passengers using the overhauled aircraft in the future.
4. The reason for this state of affairs was the political direction of the administration of the time, focused on rapprochement with Russia and conflict with the President of Poland and his pro-independence political line. It resulted in cooperation with Russia in order to make the visit to Smolensk on 10.04.2010 difficult.
5. In practice this meant:
a. agreeing to Prime Minister Putin's demand that the Prime Minister and President separate visits to Katyn in April 2010.
b. delaying the MFA's decision to inform the Russian Federation about the President's visit,
c. consent not to check the preparation of Smolensk airport to receive the President on April 10 and the safety conditions at the airport by proper services,
d. approval for non-application of the basic requirements of the HAED Instruction by Minister T. Arabski, Head of the Chancellery, including failure to prepare a reserve plane, failure to check the failure rate of Tu-154M and failure to equip the plane with the necessary devices to signal the crash,
e. change of alternative airports for Tu-154M, on the evening of 9 April agreed with Moscow (GCORL), but without informing the Polish pilots and the President of Poland about it,Ministry of National DefenseReport of the Subcommittee for Reinvestigation of the Aircraft Accident300
f. permission to divert Tu-154M No. 101 to the Smolensk landing corridor, which has been closed for 6 months,
g. failure to inform Smolensk Airport about the departure from Warsaw of Tu-154M No. 101 on 10.04.2010h. Failure to inform the President about Russian preparations to prevent the President's participation in Katyn ceremonies on 10.04.2010.
i. undertaking by Minister T. Arabski secret talks with Russian Minister J. Ushakov, who supervises the special services on behalf of Prime Minister Putin, including secret arrangements concerning the organization of the visit of the President of Poland,
j. disregarding Interpol's information about the terrorist threat to planes departing from EU capitals towards Russia on 10.04.2010.
k. entrusting the preparations of the Katyn visit of the President of the Republic of Poland to the former functionary of the Soviet intelligence service T. Turowski.
6. Without these decisions the Smoleńsk drama would not have happened. The consequence of such attitude of the leadership of administration subordinated to Prime Minister Tusk was a total disregard of all rules and regulations, including those defined by the HEAD instruction of June 2009, guaranteeing the safety of the President, by the members of state administration, officers of special services, the army and those responsible for the flights with the HEAD status. As a result of such actions the course of the Tu-154M No 101 flight was fully controlled by the Russian services.
7. The Polish pilots had been planning to go around and fly to the alternative airport in Vitebsk or Minsk since they found out about the weather threatening the landing in Smolensk at around 06:00 UTC. Meanwhile, the services (GCORL and the Center "Logika") until the last minutes before the approach to the Smolensk airport did not agree to it, indicating Sheremetyevo, Domodedovo or Vnukovo near Moscow as alternative airports.
8. This issue was the cause of dispute between Smolensk controllers and Moscow centers, which caused tension and chaos among representatives of Russian services.
9. The failures of the Smolensk systems which navigated the plane, the false bringing down of Tu-154M on the descent path in such a way that it threatened to hit the ground a kilometer before the airport strip and the lack of experience and competence of some airport services were significant.
10. Contrary to the Russian side, the Polish pilots acted in accordance and consequently according to the established plan, which assumed a controlled approach to the altitude of 100 m and going over to a go-around, and then directing the plane to the alternative airport in Vitebsk.
11. This plan was carried out until the start of the go-around, when explosions occurred in the left wing and then in the left centrewing that destroyed the aircraft and killed the passengers and crew.
12. So the real cause of the Smolensk crash was two explosions in the final phase of the flight. The first one took place over 100 metres before the place where the birch grew on the plot of N. Bodin during the departure for the second incident. The pilots consistently, starting from the first hour of the flight, announced the automatic departure in case of impossibility Ministry of National DefenseReport of the Subcommittee for Reinvestigation of the Aircraft Accident301of landing due to bad weather. They started to realize their plan as they had agreed with the Russian flight controllers before. False bringing down of the plane by Russian flight controllers who in the last phase systematically gave false data concerning the distance from the runway and the course surely made the pilots' work difficult. However, the pilots did not make any mistake and in the right time they made a decision to go-around.
13. The explosion severed the nearly 6-metres long left wing tip, destroyed the No. 2/2 slot, the upper skin of the detachable wing section, and severed the left wing flap attachment. The ABSU put the plane into glide, allowing it to maintain correct flight position for about 1 second. Later, due to the extent of damage to the slot, wing flap and covering of the removable part of the wing, the plane started to roll to the left. At the same time there were other failures: the left engine and the landing gear - the flap at the left landing gear shank broke off and the radio altimeter failed. The plane lost its vertical stabilizer, a part of the left horizontal stabilizer was also torn off. .
14. The second explosion occurred several meters above the ground about 6 seconds after the explosion in the wing, near the two furrows marking the first contact with the ground of large parts of the aircraft. It took place in the left centre-wing, which was broken into two parts, with the front stringer of the left part of the centre-wing being shot nearly 80 m to the northeast. As a result of the explosion the tail of the aircraft was also blown off together with the pressure bulkhead, and the rear part of the fuselage, after the roof was torn, fell in an inverted position with the sides turned outwards. The left side near the passenger door was also torn and destroyed, which caved in to the ground to a depth of over 1 m. The cockpit of the aircraft was also almost completely destroyed.
15. The charge that led to the explosion contained hexogen (RDX) as well as pentrite and TNT. The result of the explosion was the death of the passengers and the total destruction of the aircraft.
16. The Smolensk catastrophe showed the full preparation of the Russian side, which was ready to react to a catastrophe that would have happened a few hundred meters before the airport, which was evidenced, among other things, by the deployment of rescue services in this area.
17. Donald Tusk also acted consistently by agreeing to hand over the whole process of investigating the event immediately after the catastrophe into the hands of Prime Minister Putin and his subordinate services. This decision was made by Prime Minister Tusk during a telephone conversation with Prime Minister Putin in the morning of 10.04.2010 after the catastrophe. Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister Tusk ignored President Medvedev's proposal for a joint investigation of the crash, as stipulated by the 1993 Polish-Russian agreement.
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yle.fi
